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Abstract
This paper considers three tenure modes - owner-owned housing, tenant-owned hous-
ing, and landlord-owned housing - and models the eﬀect of the rental externality and
tenure security on housing quality. We show theoretically that the rental externality has
no impact on the housing quality of tenant-owned housing, but tenure security has an am-
biguous eﬀect when the user’s utilization and the owner’s maintenance are complements.
We also show that the rental externality and tenure security both reduce landlord-owned
housing quality when the user’s utilization and the owner’s maintenance are substitutes.
Empirical investigation yields results that are consistent with the theoretical predictions.
Keywords: tenure mode; property rights; tenure rights; rental externality; tenure security;
housing quality
JEL classiﬁcation: K11 (Property Law); K12 (Contract Law); R38 (Government Policies,
Regulatory Policies)
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1 Introduction
Property and tenure rights are important inﬂuences on housing quality. As Hirsch and Rufolo
(1999) have argued, housing services are produced using two inputs: namely, land and the
housing unit itself. The two can be readily separated, and either can be owned or rented.
Thus, dwellings have potentially diﬀerent ownership patterns. In this paper, we consider three
diﬀerent tenure modes. The ﬁrst is owner-owned and owner-occupied housing, where the land
and the housing unit are owned by an owner who leases them both to his or herself. The
second is tenant-owned and tenant-occupied housing, where the land is owned by a landowner
who leases it to a tenant who owns the housing unit on that land. The third is landlord-owned
and tenant-occupied housing, where land and the housing unit are owned by a landlord who
leases both to a tenant. We refer to the ﬁrst type of ownership as owner-owned housing, the
second as tenant-owned housing, and the third as landlord-owned housing.1
Sweeney (1974) has shown that owner-occupants maintain their housing units at a higher
standard than landlords because of pride in ownership. That is, owner-occupants value the
extra utility from maintenance more than the market, so the marginal beneﬁt of maintenance
to owner-occupants exceeds that to landlords. Therefore, landlord-owned housing deteriorates
more quickly than owner-owned housing. Henderson and Ioannides (1983) have argued that
in rental-housing contracts, the rights to use assets are temporarily transferred to tenants.
Because tenants, unlike owner-occupants, do not necessarily care about future asset values,
they tend to over-utilize dwellings. This leads to the excessive deterioration of housing prop-
erties. This is Henderson and Ioannides’ (1983) so-called rental externality.2 On the other
hand, in rental-land contracts, tenants are residual claimants on housing. Therefore, they
care about housing as owner-occupants.
Housing policy, such as the security of tenure rights, that is guaranteed by (tenancy) rent
1Kanemoto (1990) has argued that tenant-owned housing is rare in many developed economies because the
housing unit and the land are usually treated as a single property.
2Galster (1983) found empirical evidence that owner-owned housing has both a higher maintenance eﬀort
and a lower incidence of housing problems than landlord-owned housing. Shilling et al. (1991) also concluded
that landlord-owned housing depreciates faster than owner-owned housing. Gatzlaﬀ et al. (1998), however,
established that owner-owned housing depreciates relative to landlord-owned housing in some submarkets.
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controls also aﬀects housing quality.3 For example, Albon and Staﬀord (1990), Arnault (1975),
Frankena (1975), Kanemoto (1990), Kiefer (1980), Moorhouse (1972) and Seshimo (2003) have
examined the impact of (tenancy) rent control on the maintenance of (or investment in) rental
dwellings. They show that because (tenancy) rent control may reduce the proﬁt of rental
housing businesses, landlords reduce maintenance on their housing. However, Olsen (1988) has
argued that if tenants maintain the quality of their housing, (tenancy) rent control does not
necessarily reduce the quality of landlord-owned housing. This is because rent reductions are
eﬀectively transfers from landlords to tenants. However, in rental-housing contracts, tenants
are not residual claimants on the housing unit. Therefore, tenants do not consider a landlord’s
beneﬁt from any alternative use of the dwelling. For this reason, the tenant maintenance rate
may be less than the landlord maintenance rate. In rental-land contracts, Kanemoto (1990)
has shown that tenure security promotes optimal investment because it incorporates perfect
property rights.4 However, Seshimo (2003) has argued that over-investment is generated by
tenure security. This is because tenants undervalue the beneﬁts from land-use conversion
relative to continuation of the contract.
However, these analyses have all examined the decisions of owners and users in isolation.
In fact, and as put forward by Miceli (1992), both decisions aﬀect housing quality. Seshimo
(2003), for example, only considered the eﬀects of investment on rental-housing contracts.5
In this paper, both the owner and the user make an investment in each tenure mode. Fur-
thermore, investment by both aﬀects housing quality. However, investment by tenants has
diﬀerent eﬀects on the quality of dwellings to those predicted by Kanemoto (1990), Miceli
(1992), and Olsen (1988). All of these studies assume that a tenant’s investment has positive
3Rent control forces rent below market-clearing levels at an increased rate. On the other hand, tenancy
rent control governs rent increases within a tenancy, but has no power between tenancies. Many jurisdictions
around the world now implement forms of tenancy rent control. These include, amongst others, Canada,
France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and some parts of the U.S. See Arnott (2003) for
details of tenancy rent control.
4Perfect property rights imply that subletting is allowed.
5In this model, a landlord’s investment and that of the tenant occur sequentially. The landlord ﬁrst under-
takes building investment on the land, and the tenant subsequently makes a relationship-speciﬁc investment
in the rental dwelling. Seshimo (2003) showed that if tenant protection is perfect, the tenant over-invests in
the rental dwelling to increase compensation for having to involuntarily vacate the dwelling. This reduces the
opportunity to convert the use of the land. The landlord expects this to occur, and consequently decreases
investment in the building. The opposite result arises when tenure security is not protected.
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eﬀects on rental-housing quality, whereas in this paper it is assumed that it has negative
eﬀects. In our model, a tenant’s investment can be interpreted as a relationship-speciﬁc in-
vestment, as described by Seshimo (2003), or in terms of utilization intensity, as referred to
by Henderson and Ioannides (1983). It is costly for landlords to remove or mitigate damages
caused by a tenant’s investment or utilization. Therefore, tenant investment may have nega-
tive eﬀects on housing quality. In fact, rental housing contracts that forbid tenant investment
are common in Japan. Any evidence may justify our assumptions.
In the theoretical part of this paper, we obtain the following results.
• The rental externality problem does not occur in tenant-owned housing. When the
user’s utilization and the owner’s maintenance are complements, the eﬀect of tenure
security on the quality of tenant-owned housing is ambiguous.
• When the user’s utilization and the owner’s maintenance are substitutes, the quality of
landlord-owned housing is lower than that of owner-owned housing due to the rental
externality. Tenure security further reduces the quality of landlord-owned housing.
We test these predictions empirically. To do so, we follow Gyourko and Linneman (1990)
by estimating whether rent-controlled buildings are in good condition. Our empirical results
conﬁrm the above theoretical predictions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a benchmark
theoretical model without tenure security and consider the payoﬀ functions of the user and
the owner. In Section 3, we introduce tenure security. In Section 4, we investigate the eﬀect
of the rental externality and tenure security on housing quality. The data and empirical
model used are discussed in Section 5, along with the empirical results. With these results,
we investigate the welfare and policy implications for tenure security in Section 6. Section 7
summarizes the main conclusions of the paper.
2 The Eﬀects of the Rental Externality
As Hirsch and Rufolo (1999) have argued, housing services are produced using two inputs:
land and the housing unit. Either can be owned or rented. Accordingly, there are four entities
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involved: (i) the owner of the land; (ii) the owner of the housing; (iii) the user of the land;
and (iv) the user of the housing. Since a building is constructed on the land, the user of the
housing is in eﬀect the user of the land during the term of the lease. In this paper, we suggest
that housing can be owned and used under the following three tenure modes. The ﬁrst type
of ownership is owner-owned housing, in which land and the housing unit are owned by an
owner who leases both to his or herself. In this case, entities (i)–(iv) above are the same
individual. The second type is tenant-owned housing, in which land is owned by a landowner
who leases it to a tenant who owns the housing unit on the land. In this case, the landowner
is entity (i) and the tenant is entities (ii), (iii), and (iv). The third type is landlord-owned
housing, in which land and the housing unit are owned by a landlord who leases both to a
tenant. In this case, the landlord is entities (i) and (ii) and the tenant is entities (iii) and
(iv).
Because we focus on the quality of housing, we assume that housing comprises a single unit
constructed on a plot of a land, and that its construction cost is 0. In this section, we consider
a two-period model without tenure security in which we only focus on the eﬀects of the rental
externality on housing quality. Housing quality in period 1 is given. Housing quality in period
2 (q2) is assumed to be a function of m, the maintenance undertaken by the owner of the
housing to mitigate quality deterioration during period 1, and u, the intensity with which the
user of housing utilizes the unit in period 1. That is, m and u undertaken in period 1 have
spillover eﬀects on housing quality in period 2. We assume that repair work, which the owner
of the housing performs, is completed at the end of period 1. As a result, the current level
of m does not aﬀect housing quality in period 1. Moreover, additional m and u are assumed
to be zero in the second period.6 The variable m represents large-scale investment in the
structural part of the housing unit, such as maintenance of a roof, a wall or a support. This
maintenance increases q2 at a decreasing rate. Thus, q2m > 0, and q2mm < 0. The variable u
represents the intensity with which the user of the housing utilizes the unit. Utilization has
positive eﬀects for the user living in the dwelling. However, utilization damages walls and
6The level of investment in our model is determined in the ﬁrst period. See Kanemoto (1990) for the
relationship between additional investment and tenure security.
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ﬂoors. Thus, u has negative eﬀects on the social evaluation of q2; i.e., q2u < 0.7 We do not
make an assumption about the depreciation rate, and instead assume that q2u < 0. It seems
plausible that higher rates of utilization by the user lower housing quality at an increasing
rate. Thus, we assume that q2uu < 0. The sign of q2um is discussed below.
The utilization rate u is eﬀective in both periods, but m is eﬀective in period 2 for the
initial user’s utility. Thus, the initial user derives utility of v1(u) in period 1 and v2(u,m) in
period 2 from housing, where vtu > 0, vtuu < 0 (t ∈ {1, 2}), v2m > 0, v2mm < 0. The sign of
v2um is discussed below. The user also derives utility from the location of the land. However,
we ignore this eﬀect because we assume that the initial tenant can potentially move to other
dwellings.8
The rental price in period 1 (R1) depends on the value (quality) of housing r1 and on the
value of the location of the land γ1; i.e., R1 = R1(r1, γ1). We assume that the rental price
has the additive form R1 = r1 + γ1. The rental price in period 2 (R2) depends on the value
(quality) of housing r2 and on the value of the location of the land γ2; i.e., R2 = r2 + γ2. We
assume that q2(u,m) can be expressed in pecuniary terms. Thus, r2 = q2(u,m). The value of
the location of the land γ2 is a random variable, and both the owner and the user know the
probability distribution function (pdf) f(γ2), which is assumed to be uniform on the interval
[0, γ¯2], where 0 < γ¯2.9
In each period, the landowner oﬀers the homeowner (the user of land) a rent γt, and the
homeowner oﬀers the user of the dwelling a gross rent Rt. At the beginning of period 1, the
7Consider rented housing. Assume that both the landlord and the potential tenant observe u, but that a
court cannot (Henderson and Ioannides 1983, Kanemoto 1990). In this case, it is diﬃcult to write a contract
that requires the tenant to restore the rental housing to its original condition. Hence, the landlord cannot
charge the tenant for wear and tear of the rental housing caused by the tenant’s activities. The landlord
takes a deposit from the tenant to mitigate over-utilization by the tenant. However, because the court cannot
observe the utilization rate of the tenant, deposits are ineﬀective. Furthermore, the Japanese Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, and Transport has introduced guidelines relating to the return of deposits. These guidelines
state that landlords should return deposits to tenants when the following types of damage have occurred:
(a) indentations in carpet caused by furniture; (b) screw-holes made by the tenant for the installation of
air-conditioning; (c) thumbtack-holes made by the tenant; (d) tobacco stains on walls; and (e) stains on walls
from electric discharge by refrigerators. Hence, it is diﬃcult for landlords to induce responsible behavior by
tenants by imposing a deposit.
8See Eq. (2) below.
9The eﬀects of the rental externality on housing quality do not depend on the functional form of the pdf.
Similarly, the eﬀects of tenure security on tenant-owned housing quality do not depend on this assumption.
The eﬀects of tenure security on landlord-owned housing quality, however, do depend on this simplifying
assumption.
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owner and the user make a one-period lease contract. The tenancy terminates at the end
of period 1. In the second period, rent is oﬀered by the owner, and the initial user decides
to either continue to rent or move at the beginning of period 2. Before examining this, we
consider the relationship between q2 and v2.
If the utilization rate is 0, or in other words, if the initial user does not add any investment
during period 1, it is plausible that the second-period user’s utility from the housing equals
the social evaluation q2. However, since we assume u > 0 and q2u < 0 (u only beneﬁts the
initial user), the second-period user’s utility v2 from the housing exceeds the social evaluation.
Thus,
∀m v2(u,m) > q2(u,m).
Furthermore, assume that
∃γ′2 ∈ (0, γ¯2] v2(u,m) < q2(u,m) + γ′2.
This implies that the second period user’s utility can be less than the second period value of
the land with a dwelling, if we consider the random variable γ2.
We also assume that
∀u,m v2m = q2m. (1)
This assumption implies that the marginal utility of m for the initial tenant is equivalent to
the marginal social evaluation of m for all u and m.
In our model, the sign of the cross-partial derivatives of v2(u,m) and q2(u,m) are of critical
importance, because these signs aﬀect the type of strategic interaction between the inputs
of owners and users. From assumption Eq. (1), v2um must equal q2um; i.e., v2um = q2um.
Therefore, if v2um is negative (positive), then q2um is negative (positive).10
We normalize the reservation utility level at 0 when the initial user lives in another dwelling
in period 2. Then the maximum rent that he or she pays for the dwelling while enjoying a
10For example, suppose that a tenant accidentally spills sauce on the carpet and the landlord cleans it up.
The more sauce that is spilt, the more diﬃcult it is for the landlord to clean up. In this case, q2um is negative.
Next, suppose that the tenant papers the walls. As Seshimo (2003) has stated, the tenant cannot enjoy the
wallpaper without the wall (which is maintained well). In this case, q2um is positive.
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utility level of at least 0 can be written as v2(u,m). Suppose that the owner has no bargaining
power.11 Then, at the beginning of the second period, the owner of the housing oﬀers the
gross rent R2 = q2(u,m) + γ2. The initial user renews the contract if the maximum rent is
greater than or equal to the oﬀered rent. Otherwise, he or she moves to other housing and
obtains the reservation utility level. Hence, the eﬃcient renewal-move condition is as follows:
{
F (γ∗2) = Pr[v2(u,m) ≥ q2(u,m) + γ2] ⇒ renewal,
1− F (γ∗2) = Pr[v2(u,m) < q2(u,m) + γ2] ⇒ move,
(2)
where F (γ2) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of γ2. Equation (2) implies that
the tenant renews the contract if γ2 is less than or equal to γ∗2 , or otherwise moves to other
housing in period 2. We refer to γ∗2 as the critical value. From Eq. (2), we have
γ∗2 = γ
∗
2(u,m) = v2(u,m)− q2(u,m).
The critical value thus depends on both u and m.
2.1 Payoﬀs to the Owner and the User
Assume that the owner and the user are both risk neutral and have the same discount factor,
set at unity. Then, from Eq. (2), the utility of the user of the housing and the land is
v1(u)−R1 − g(u) +
∫ γ∗2
0
[v2(u,m)− q2(u,m)− γ2]f(γ2)dγ2, (3)
where g(u) is the cost of utilization during period 1, in which gu > 0 and guu > 0 for all u.
Consider the housing owner. The owner obtains q2(u,m) whether or not the initial user
renews the contract in period 2 with both owner-owned housing and landlord-owned housing
because the property rights are protected. In tenant-owned housing, the landowner and the
homeowner are separated. Thus the homeowner (=tenant) has to return the land and lose the
dwelling when he or she moves in period 2. Land Lease and House Lease Law in Japan (Article
13), however, admits that the tenant has a right of claim to the landowner to purchase the
housing at the market price. Therefore, the homeowner in tenant-owned housing also obtains
q2(u,m) whether or not he or she renews the contract in period 2. Noting that the net rent
11See Kanemoto (1990) and Seshimo (2003) for the eﬀect of the bargaining power of lessors and lessees on
housing investment.
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for the homeowner in each period is rt = Rt−γt, then, the homeowner’s proﬁt can be written
as
r1 − c(m) +
∫ γ2
0
q2(u,m)f(γ2)dγ2, (4)
where c(m) is the cost of maintenance in period 1, in which cm > 0 and cmm > 0 for all m.
We next examine the proﬁt of the owner of the land. The landowner obtains γ2 whether
or not the initial user renews the contract in period 2. Therefore, the proﬁt for the landowner
is
γ1 +
∫ γ2
0
γ2f(γ2)dγ2. (5)
In the following sections, we consider the payoﬀs in each tenure mode.
2.1.1 Owner-owned housing
The payoﬀ for owner-owned housing is the sum of the user’s payoﬀ (Eq. (3)), the homeowner’s
payoﬀ (Eq. (4)), and the landowner’s payoﬀ (Eq. (5)). From the assumption that f(γ2) is
uniform, the utility (V ) of the owner can be rewritten as
max
u,m
VO = v1(u)− g(u)− c(m) + γ
∗
2
γ2
v2(u,m) +
γ2 − γ∗2
γ2
[
q2(u,m) +
γ2 + γ∗2
2
]
. (6)
where the subscript O refers to owner-owned housing. Eq. (6) implies that the owner chooses
u and m to maximize not only his or her utility (the sum of the ﬁrst and fourth terms on the
right-hand side) but also potential future tenants’ or buyers’ utilities (the last term on the
right-hand side).
The ﬁrst-order conditions for u and m are
VOu = v1u +
γ∗2
γ2
(v2u − q2u) + q2u − gu = 0, (7)
VOm = q2m − cm = 0. (8)
These two equations deﬁne the utilization rate function uO(m) and the maintenance function
mO(u).12 The sign of both the utilization rate function and the maintenance function depend
on the mixed partial of the objective function with respect to u and m. We deﬁne the
following:
12We assume that an interior solution exists to the ﬁrst-order conditions, respectively. This is assumed to
hold throughout this paper.
9
Definition 1 If the mixed partial of the objective function with respect to u and m is nega-
tive (positive), both the utilization rate function and the maintenance function become a(n)
decreasing (increasing) function. That is, u and m are substitutes (complements). We refer
to the substitutes (complements) case as case S (C).
The equilibrium input levels, (uO,mO), can be found by solving Eq. (7) and (8) simulta-
neously, which yields the intersection point of the two functions.13
2.1.2 Tenant-owned housing
Note that the homeowner is the tenant (the user of the land and the housing) in the rental-
land contract. Thus, the payoﬀ for the tenant is the sum of Eqs. (3) and (4). Noting that
f(γ2) is uniform, the maximization problem for the tenant is
max
u,m
VT = v1(u)− γ1 − g(u)− c(m) + γ
∗
2
γ2
[
v2(u,m)− γ
∗
2
2
]
+
γ2 − γ∗2
γ2
q2(u,m). (9)
where the subscript T refers to tenant-owned housing.
Consider the landowner (the owner of the land). The payoﬀ for the landowner (ΠT ) is
equal to Eq. (5). Therefore, the proﬁt for the landowner can be written as
ΠT = γ1 +
γ2
2
.
The solution to Eq. (9) satisﬁes
VTu = v1u +
γ∗2
γ2
(v2u − q2u) + q2u − gu = 0, (10)
VTm = q2m − cm = 0. (11)
These two equations deﬁne the functions uT (m) and mT (u). The values of u and m that
simultaneously satisfy Eqs. (10) and (11) are denoted by (uT ,mT ).
2.1.3 Landlord-owned housing
In the rental-housing contract, the maximization problem for the tenant can be rewritten as
max
u
VL = v1(u)−R1 − g(u) + γ
∗
2
γ2
[
v2(u,m)− q2(u,m)− γ
∗
2
2
]
, (12)
13The second-order condition for a maximum is assumed to hold throughout the paper. Moreover, only the
unique equilibrium is considered below.
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where the subscript L refers to landlord-owned housing.
Consider the landlord (the owner of the land and the housing). The payoﬀ for the landlord
(ΠL) is the sum of Eqs. (4) and (5). Therefore, the proﬁt-maximization problem for the
landlord can be written as
max
m
ΠL = R1 − c(m) + q2(u,m) + γ22 . (13)
Eq. (13) implies that the landlord obtains R2 = q2(u,m) + γ2 whether or not the initial
tenant renews the contract in period 2. This implies that the property rights are perfectly
protected in landlord-owned housing when there is no tenure security.
The solutions to Eqs. (12) and (13) satisfy, respectively
VLu = v1u +
γ∗2
γ2
(v2u − q2u)− gu = 0, (14)
ΠLm = q2m − cm = 0. (15)
From this condition, we obtain the function uL(m) and mL(u). The utilization-rate function
uL(m), however, does not depend on m.14 The reason for this is that the tenant cannot
increase utility by changing the rate of utilization when landlord maintenance changes, be-
cause the increment of landlord maintenance induces a rent increase just suﬃcient to oﬀset
the marginal utility of m in period 2 (see Eq. (1)). The equilibrium input levels, uL and mL,
can be found by simultaneously solving Eqs. (14) and (15). 15
3 The Eﬀects of Tenure Security
In this section, we consider the eﬀects of tenure security on the payoﬀ functions. In Japan, for
the landowner (landlord) to terminate the contract despite the tenant’s desire for renewal, he
or she must approach a court and prove just cause (Land Lease and House Lease Law, Article
6 for land leases and Article 28 for house leases). In the rental-land (rental-housing) contract,
just cause is acknowledged by a court when the owner’s need for the land (housing) unit is
greater than that of the tenant. To introduce this into our model, we interpret just cause as
14We have duL(m)/dm = −VLum/VLuu, where VLum = 0.
15The stability condition is assumed to hold throughout the paper.
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follows. At the beginning of the second period, the court compares the owner’s revenue and
the initial tenant’s utility, and accords the owner the right to use the land (housing) unit if
the former is greater than the latter. Otherwise, it gives the tenant the right to use. The
court, however, has a tendency to underestimate the owner’s revenue due to tenure security.
Furthermore, to prevent eviction with a rent increase (Articles 11 and 32), the court lowers
the contract-renewal rent to the level of the owner’s revenue, which is underestimated.
3.1 Tenant-owned housing
If both the landowner and the initial tenant expect this to occur, the initial tenant’s choice
at the beginning of period 2 in the rental-land contract case can be represented as follows:
{
F (γˆ2) = Pr[v2(u,m) ≥ q2(u,m) + 1αγ2] ⇒ renewal,
1− F (γˆ2) = Pr[v2(u,m) < q2(u,m) + 1αγ2] ⇒ move,
(16)
where α (α > 1) is the parameter representing the underestimation by the court that the
landlord and the initial tenant anticipate.16 Thus, the critical value changes as follows:
γˆ2 = γˆ2(u,m, α) = α [v2(u,m)− q2(u,m)] .
Because α > 1, we have γˆ2 > γ∗2 . Hence, the probability of renewal is higher when α > 1.
Thus, α implies the degree of tenure security.
In Japan, when the tenant is the owner of the housing, the property rights for the housing
are protected by tenancy rent control (Article 13). Noting this, Eq. (16), and the form of
f(ε), the maximization problem of the tenant becomes
max
u,m
V ST = v1(u)− γ1 − c(m)− g(u) +
γˆ2
γ2
[
v2(u,m)− 1
α
γˆ2
2
]
+
γ2 − γˆ2
γ2
q2(u,m). (17)
where superscript S refers to the case with tenure security. Because tenure security raises the
probability of renewal, it increases the expected payoﬀ when the tenant renews the contract.
16Landowners (or landlords) may discount the contract-renewal rent voluntarily to retain current tenants to
whom they wish to continue renting the unit. However, we ignore this voluntary tenure discount. See Hubert
(1995) for tenure discount issues.
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In the case of tenure security, the landowner can obtain γ2 when the initial tenant moves
to other housing in period 2. However, he or she only obtains (1/α)γ2 when the initial tenant
renews the contract. That is, landownership is reduced by tenure security. Therefore, the
proﬁt for the landowner is as follows:
ΠST =
γˆ2
γ2
(
1
α
γˆ2
2
)
+
γ2 − γˆ2
γ2
(
γ2 + γˆ2
2
)
.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for Eq. (17) are
V STu = v1u +
γˆ2
γ2
(v2u − q2u) + q2u − gu = 0, (18)
V STm = q2m − cm = 0. (19)
Eqs. (18) and (19) deﬁne the functions uST (m,α) and m
S
T (u). The equilibrium is the set of u
and m that satisﬁes these two equations, and is denoted by (uST ,m
S
T ).
3.2 Landlord-owned housing
Because tenure security lowers the contract-renewal rent R2 = q2(u,m) + γ2, the initial
tenant’s choice at the beginning of period 2 in a rental-housing contract can be represented
as follows:
{
F (γ˜2) = Pr{v2(u,m) ≥ 1α [q2(u,m) + γ2]} ⇒ renewal,
1− F (γ˜2) = Pr{v2(u,m) < 1α [q2(u,m) + γ2]} ⇒ move.
(20)
The critical value changes as follows:
γ˜2 = γ˜2(u,m, α) = αv2(u,m)− q2(u,m).
Because α > 1, we have γ˜2 > γ∗2 .
Noting Eq. (20), and the form of f(ε), the maximization problem of the tenant becomes
max
u
V SL = v1(u)−R1 − g(u) +
γ˜2
γ2
[
v2(u,m)− 1
α
q2(u,m)− 1
α
γ˜2
2
]
. (21)
Thus, tenure security increases the expected payoﬀ when the tenant renews the contract.
In the case of tenure security, the landlord can obtain q2(u,m)+γ2 when the initial tenant
moves to other housing in period 2. However, he or she only obtains (1/α)[q2(u,m)+γ2] when
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the initial tenant renews the contract. That is, property rights are reduced by tenure security.
Therefore, the proﬁt-maximization problem for the landlord is as follows:
max
m
ΠSL = R1 − c(m) +
γ˜2
γ2
1
α
[
q2(u,m) +
γ˜2
2
]
+
γ2 − γ˜2
γ2
[
q2(u,m) +
γ2 + γ˜2
2
]
. (22)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for Eqs. (21) and (22) are
V SLu = v1u +
γ˜2
γ2
(
v2u − 1
α
q2u
)
− gu = 0, (23)
ΠSLm =
(
γ˜2
γ2
1
α
+
γ2 − γ˜2
γ2
)
q2m +
γ˜2m
γ2
(
1
α
− 1
)
(q2 + γ˜2)− cm = 0, (24)
respectively. We obtain uSL(m,α) from Eq. (23), and m
S
L(u, α) from Eq. (24). The equilibrium
is the intersection point of uSL(m,α) and m
S
L(u, α), and is denoted by (u
S
L,m
S
L).
4 Housing Quality
Because owner-owned housing internalizes all payoﬀ functions, the equilibrium input levels,
uO and mO, are eﬃcient solutions. Therefore, we set q2(uO,mO) as the quality benchmark,
and compare this with the quality of tenant-owned housing and landlord-owned housing.
4.1 Tenant-Owned Housing
First, we compare the ﬁrst-order condition of owner-owned housing with that of tenant-owned
housing to investigate the impact of the rental externality on housing quality. Comparing
Eq. (7) with Eq. (10), we have uO(m) = uT (m) for all m. The tenant utilizes the housing
similar to owner-owned housing because he or she can capture its residual value in period 2.
Second, we can determine the eﬀect of tenure security by comparing Eq. (10) with Eq. (18).
We have uT (m) < uST (m,α) for all m, given α > 1. The strengthening of tenure rights by
tenancy rent control tends to increase over-utilization of the dwelling by the tenant.
Consider the level of m. Comparing Eqs. (8) with (11), and with Eq. (19), we have
mO(u) = mT (u) = mST (u) for all u. This result is inconsistent with Kanemoto (1990). In his
model, the tenant can not capture the beneﬁt of the dwelling in period 2, if the tenant has
no security of tenure. Because tenure security raises the marginal beneﬁt of investment in
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period 2, it consequently increases tenant investment in period 1. In our model, however, the
tenant perfectly receives the beneﬁts of housing in period 2, regardless of tenure security.
From the above analysis, we obtain the following propositions.
Proposition 1 (i) In case S, uO = uT < uST , mO = mT > m
S
T . Thus, we have
q2(uO,mO) = q2(uT ,mT ) > q2(uST ,m
S
T ). (25)
(ii) In case C, uO = uT < uST , mO = mT < m
S
T . Thus,
q2(uO,mO) = q2(uT ,mT )  q2(uST ,mST ). (26)
Figures 1 illustrates case C, where EO is the equilibrium for owner-owned housing. Because
uO(m) = uT (m) and mO(u) = mT (u), the equilibrium for tenant-owned housing without
tenure security is also EO = ET .
Because tenure security shifts the curve for u above uT (m); e.g., uST (m,α), the equilibrium
for tenant-owned housing with tenure security moves to EST . The over-investment occurs
because u and m are complements. Thus, there is the case where tenure security raises the
quality of tenant-owned housing in case C.
4.2 Landlord-owned housing
Consider next the quality of landlord-owned housing. First, compare Eq. (7) with Eq. (14).
Because q2u < 0, the marginal beneﬁt of u is larger in Eq. (14) than in Eq. (7) while
the marginal costs are the same. Hence, uO(m) < uL(m) for all m. That is, the tenant
ignores the rental externality and has an incentive to over-utilize rental housing. This result
is consistent with Henderson and Ioannides (1983). Second, comparing Eq. (14) and Eq.
(23) indicates that uL(m) < uSL(m,α) for all m, given α > 1. That is, the marginal proﬁt of
u is increased by tenure security. This result is consistent with Seshimo (2003). Therefore,
uO(m) < uL(m) < uSL(m,α).
Eq. (8) is equivalent to Eq. (15). Hence, landlord maintenance in landlord-owned housing
is equal to that in owner-owned housing; i.e., mO(u) = mL(u) for all u. This is because the
landlord derives the beneﬁt of his or her maintenance from the rent increase in period 2. As
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discussed in Section 2.1.3, this implies that property rights are protected when there is no
tenancy rent control. Comparing Eq. (15) and Eq. (24) reveals that mL(u) > mSL(u, α) for
all u, given α > 1. This implies that the marginal proﬁt of m is reduced by tenure security.
This result is consistent with Kanemoto (1990) and Seshimo (2003).
Accordingly, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (i) In case S, uO < uL < uSL and mO > mL > m
S
L. Thus, we have
q2(uO,mO) > q2(uL,mL) > q2(uSL,m
S
L). (27)
(ii) In case C, uO < uL < uSL, mO < mL, mO  mSL, mL  mSL. Thus, the ranking of quality
in case C is ambiguous.
In case S, the equilibrium of landlord-owned housing without tenure security is located
on mO(u) above uO; e.g., EL in Fig. 2. The landlord’s under-investment results from over-
utilization by the tenant. Thus, double-moral hazard occurs in case S.
Proposition 2 (i) also implies that the levels of over-utilization and under-investment due
to the rental externality increase, largely because of tenure security in case S. Figure 2 com-
pares the equilibrium with tenure security (ESL) and without it (EL) in case S. The equilibrium
moves in the gray area above uL; e.g., ESL , when tenure rights are strengthened and property
rights are weakened by tenancy rent control. Therefore, tenure security accelerates the dete-
rioration of rental-housing quality induced initially by the eﬀect of the rental externality in
case S.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 The Data and the Empirical Model
Let us summarize the previous section. Proposition 1 implies that the rental externality
has no impact on the quality of tenant-owned housing (q2(uO,mO) = q2(uT ,mT )) in both
cases S and C. Equation (25) shows that tenure security reduces the quality of tenant-owned
housing (q2(uT ,mT ) > q2(uST ,m
S
T )) in case S. Eq. (26), however, implies that housing quality
varies ambiguously due to tenure security in case C (q2(uT ,mT )  q2(uST ,mST )). Equation
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(27) shows that the quality of landlord-owned housing deteriorates relative to that of owner-
owned housing according to the rental externality in case S (q2(uO,mO) > q2(uL,mL)). In
addition, this equation predicts that tenure security accelerates the deterioration of landlord-
owned housing in this case (q2(uL,mL) > q2(uSL,m
S
L)). However, in case C, it is possible for
the quality of landlord-owned housing to exceed that of owner-owned housing. Therefore, the
model demonstrates that the impact of the rental externality and tenure security on housing
quality is an empirical question. In this section, we investigate the empirical evidence on this
issue.
We use the 1998 Japanese Housing Demand Survey (JHDS) conducted by the Ministry of
Land, Infrastructure and Transport. In practice, we cannot directly estimate q2(u,m) because
q2 is unobservable. However, the JHDS provides information on the degree of dilapidation
in the following three categories: repairs not needed, or slight repairs needed; major repairs
needed; and dilapidated beyond repair. As in Gyourko and Linneman (1990), we refer to
housing needing no or slight repairs as sound. Housing needing major repairs and dilapidated
housing are referred to as not sound. Table 1 shows the percentage of sound housing in
the sample. By deﬁning a dummy variable for ‘sound’, the following probit speciﬁcation is
estimated:
Pr(Sound = 1) = Φ(Xβ), (28)
where Pr(Sound = 1) is the probability that the unit is sound, Φ is the standard normal cdf,
X is the vector of explanatory variables, and β is the vector of probit coeﬃcients.17
We do not observe u and m, which are elements of X. That is, we cannot obtain m for
landlord-owned housing or u for all housing from the JHDS. Therefore, we use the following
equations to estimate the eﬀects of the rental externality and tenure security on housing
quality.
17The dummy variable, sound, is deﬁned as follows:
Sound = 1 if q2 > q¯2,
Sound = 0 otherwise,
where q¯2 is the critical quality of not being sound.
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First, we use the tenure-mode dummies, tenant-owned housing (landlord-owned
housing), with owner-owned housing being the reference tenure mode, which control
for building age, to capture the eﬀect of the rental externality by using the observations on
owner-owned housing and tenant-owned (landlord-owned) housing. As shown, the propen-
sity to utilize and maintain the dwelling (the equilibrium input levels of u and m) depends
on the tenure mode. Hence, these dummies are proxy variables for u and m. In estimat-
ing the rental externality, we also control for tenancy duration, because the longer-duration
tenant-owned (landlord-owned) housing is protected by tenancy rent control. There are four
categories of building age i: built pre-1970; built 1971–1980; built 1981–1990; and
built 1991–1998. The JHDS records the year of relocation to the present dwelling. We
use four categories determined by moving age j: move-in pre-1970; move-in 1971–1980;
move-in 1981–1990; andmove-in 1991–1998.18 In the older category, periods for tenancy
duration are long. Thus, we suppose that tenure security is less likely to inﬂuence the group
with the most-recent moving age. Ultimately, we make the following three-way interaction
terms to investigate the rental externality:
Tenure-mode× Building agei ×Moving agej . (29)
Owner-owned housings constructed between 1991 and 1998 into which respondents moved in
during the same period are the reference group. The sign of the tenure-mode dummies where
j = 1991− 1998 tells us the eﬀect of the rental externality.
Second, we use the moving-in year dummies in Eq. (29) to capture the eﬀect of tenure
security. As discussed, because the longer-duration housing is protected by tenancy rent
control, a movement of tenure-mode dummies where j ∈ {1981−1990, 1971−1980,pre−1970}
from benchmark year (j = 1991 − 1998) suggests the eﬀect of tenure security on housing
quality. As found in theory, the propensity to utilize and maintain the dwelling depends
on the degree of tenure security. Thus, these dummies also proxy u and m. On the other
hand, we expect the quality of owner-owned housing does not depend on tenancy duration,
because tenure security has no impact on this type of dwelling. Thus, we should observe
18If the current house was rebuilt on the same site after the respondent moved in, we have equated the
moved-in year to the rebuilt year.
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the coeﬃcients of owner-owned housings (tenure-mode dummies in Eq. (29) are 0) remain
constant.
In addition, we control for the construction material of building, city size, number of
dwelling rooms (room), and the total annual income (before tax) earned by all households
members (income) in estimating Eq. (28). Construction material is classiﬁed into the fol-
lowing four categories: buildings whose main frames are made of wood (this is the reference
group); wooden; buildings whose main frames are made of ferroconcrete and steel ferro-
concrete; steel reinforced concrete (SRC); buildings whose outer walls are made of blocks;
block; and others. Three geographical categories are also included: twenty-three Tokyo
wards; Tokyo; twelve major cities outside Tokyo; large city; and all other areas; other
area (reference). Income is classiﬁed into nine diﬀerent categories in the JHDS, from 1 (the
lowest) to 9 (the highest). We include this income level index in the explanatory variables in
Eq. (28).
To estimate only the eﬀects of the rental externality and tenure security, we limit the
sample to single-family houses. This is because there is a free-rider problem in condominiums
and apartment buildings in the sense that owners have a disincentive to maintain common
areas and users have an incentive to over-utilize these areas.
Table 1 reports frequencies, means, or modes for the variables used in the probit analysis.
Screening the data from complete information on the selected variables produces a sample
of 43, 520 observations. Of these 89.6% (39, 013 dwellings) are owner-owned housing, 5.2%
(2, 267) are tenant-owned housing, and 5.2% (2, 240) are landlord-owned housing, respectively.
Note that 9.9% of owner-owned units are in structures reported as not sound, while 14.4% of
tenant-owned units, and 24.5% of landlord-owned units are reported as being in housing in a
not sound condition.
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5.2 Estimation Results
Table 2 presents the probit coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects of the rental externality and
tenure security on tenant-owned housing.19 The coeﬃcients shown with bold ﬁgures indicate
the eﬀect of the rental externality. The statistically insigniﬁcant sign of these ﬁgures for the
tenant-owned housing dummy implies that the rental externality has no impact on the quality
of tenant-owned housing as expected.
The coeﬃcients shown with ﬁgures in italics indicate the eﬀect of tenure security on
tenant-owned housing. Note that the italic ﬁgures for the tenant-owned housing dummy are
all of negative sign, and two of them are signiﬁcant. That is, there are no positive signs.
This indicates that the quality of tenant-owned housing is lower than, or equal to, that of
owner-owned housing due to tenure security. Figure 3 indicates the relationship between
tenancy duration and housing quality for owner-owned housing, which obtain from Table 2.
As expected, Figure 3 shows that the quality of owner-owned housing does not depend much
on tenancy duration. By adding the marginal eﬀect of owner-owned housing with moving age
j controlled by building age i (i × j) and that of tenant-owned housing dummy, we obtain
the gross marginal eﬀect of tenure security on tenant-owned housing with i× j. For example,
the gross marginal eﬀect of tenant-owned housing with moving age 1971− 1980 constructed
between 1971 and 1980 becomes (−0.126 − 0.034) = −0.160 (−16.0%). When the marginal
eﬀect is insigniﬁcant, we do not add the ﬁgure. By doing this, we obtain Figure 4. Figure
4 shows that the quality of tenant-owned housing depends on tenancy duration. In line
with the theoretical prediction in case C, tenure security has an ambiguous eﬀect on tenant-
owned housing quality. For example, consider housing built before 1970. Housing moved into
between 1991 and 1998 is more likely to be sound than housing moved into between 1981 and
1990 (with respective probabilities of −19.2% and −24.1%). However, housing moved into
between 1981 and 1990 is more likely to be unsound than housing moved into between 1971
and 1980 (with respective probabilities of −24.1% and −18.5%).
19The marginal eﬀects are calculated as
Pr(Sound = 1)|dummy variable = 1 − Pr(Sound = 1)|dummy variable =0.
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Table 3 reports the probit coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects of the rental externality (bold
ﬁgures) and tenure security (italic ﬁgures) on landlord-owned housing. The statistically sig-
niﬁcant sign of the bold ﬁgures for the landlord-owned dummy (except for housing moved
into between 1991 and 1998 constructed before 1970) implies that landlord-owned housing
has a lower probability of being in sound condition than owner-owned housing. These results
suggest that the rental externality reduces the quality of dwellings. They are then consistent
with the theoretical predictions in case S.
Note that all italic ﬁgures have a statistically signiﬁcant negative sign. Similar to Table
2, we obtain the relationship between tenancy duration and housing quality for each tenure
mode. The impact of tenure security on owner-owned housing is qualitatively the same as
those resulting from Figure 3: this ﬁgure is omitted. Figure 5 shows the more recent the
move-in date, the smaller the absolute value of the marginal eﬀect (except for housing moved
into between 1981 and 1990 and constructed before 1970). This implies that the longer
the tenancy duration, the greater the extent of deterioration. Thus, tenure security further
reduces the quality of landlord-owned housing. This result conﬁrms the theoretical prediction
of case S.
6 Welfare and Policy Implications for Tenure Security
Considering the estimation results, we now investigate the welfare and policy implications for
tenancy rent control (Land Lease and Housing Lease Law) in Japan. First, the impact of
tenure security on the homeowner’s utility of tenant-owned housing is found by diﬀerentiating
Eq. (17) with respect to α. Using the envelope theorem, then this yields
V STα =
γˆ2
γ2
1
α2
(
γˆ2
2
)
> 0. (30)
The RHS in Eq. (30) implies that tenure security lowers the contract-renewal rent for the
tenant. Therefore tenure security increases the homeowner’s utility. The impact of tenure
security on the landowner’s proﬁt is represented by
ΠSTα =
γˆ2α
γ2
(
1
α
− 1
)
γˆ2 − 1
α2
γˆ2
γ2
γˆ2
2
+ ΠSTu
∂uST
∂α
< 0, (31)
21
where
ΠSTu =
γˆ2u
γ2
(
1
α
− 1
)
γˆ2 < 0.
Note that ∂uST /∂α is positive in case C. Thus the third term of the RHS in Eq. (31) is
negative. The second term on the RHS in Eq. (31) implies that tenure security lowers the
contract renewal rent. Because the ﬁrst term on the RHS in Eq. (31) is negative, the sign
of Eq. (31) becomes negative. This implies that tenure security decreases the landowner’s
proﬁts.
Since the decrease of the contract-renewal rent due to tenure security is transferred from
the landowner to the initial tenant, the absolute value of Eq. (31) is larger than Eq. (30).
This implies that tenure security creates an ineﬃciency result of the rental-land contract.
Next, consider the impact of tenure security on landlord-owned housing. Similar to the
tenant-owned housing, we can drive the impact of tenure security on each player’s welfare as
the following:
V SLα =
γ˜2
γ2
1
α2
(
q2 +
γ˜2
2
)
+ V SLm
∂mSL
∂α
, (32)
where
V SLm =
γ˜2m
γ2
(
v2 − 1
α
q2
)
> 0,
and
ΠSLα =
γ˜2α
γ2
(
1
α
− 1
)
(q2 + γ˜2)− 1
α2
γ˜2
γ2
(
q2 +
γ˜2
2
)
+ΠSLu
∂uSL
∂α
< 0, (33)
where
ΠSLu =
γ˜2u
γ2
(
1
α
− 1
)
(q2 + γ˜2) + q2u < 0.
The ﬁrst term of RHS in Eq. (32) implies that tenure security lowers the contract-renewal
rent for the tenant, and the sign is positive. Note that ∂mSL/∂α is negative, because we
observe case S in empirical section. Thus the second term of the RHS in Eq. (32) is negative.
Therefore, tenure security may increase or decrease a tenant’s utility. Note that ∂uSL/∂α is
positive in case S. Because all the term of RHS in Eq. (33) is negative, the sign of Eq. (33)
becomes negative. This implies that tenure security decreases the landlord’s proﬁt.
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From V SLα+ Π
S
Lα, we obtain a negative sign. This implies that deterioration of rental-
housing quality due to tenure security results in ineﬃciency of the rental-housing contract in
case S.
The Land Lease and House Lease Law in Japan was recently revised. In 1992, the ﬁxed-
term rental-land contract that enabled landowners to refuse renewal of a contract that has
expired was introduced (Articles 22 and 23) and that for rental-housing contract in 2000
(Article 38).20 It is not necessary for the landowner (landlord) to show any just cause to
terminate the contract under this contract. This implies that α is equal to 1 in our model.
As a result, these reforms provide more eﬃcient contracts.
A problem, however, still exists for tenant-owned housing and landlord-owned housing.
First, Article 22 says that under a lease with a term of ﬁfty years or more, the tenant
(=homeowner) has no property rights over their dwelling, so no request can be made to the
landowner to purchase the asset on the rented site: Article 13 does not apply. Kanemoto
(1990) and Seshimo (2003) argue that if property rights are not perfectly protected, tenants
do not adequately maintain their dwellings. The same is true of our model. Article 22
implies that ((γ¯2 − γ∗2)/γ¯2)q2 vanishes from Eq. (9). Because the tenant can not receive the
all beneﬁts, the choice of u and m become ineﬃcient. Thus, the rental externality problem
occurs in tenant-owned housing under Article 22. Second, Articles 22 and 23 (Article 38)
only apply to new rental-land (housing) contracts. If the tenant wishes to remain in his or
her rental land (housing), the landowner (landlord) cannot easily refuse the request. That
is, the landowner (landlord) who contracted with a tenant before the amendment does not
have perfect property rights. Thus, the deterioration problem of rental-housing quality due
to tenure security remains in older contracts. Our model oﬀers a simple policy implication:
protecting the property rights of the homeowner provides more eﬃcient contracts. From this
viewpoint, a ﬁxed-term contract should be applied to contracts made before the amendments.
20In the Japanese market, dwellings protected by tenure security (the general contract) and unprotected
dwellings (the ﬁxed-term contract) coexist.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated three tenure modes: owner-owned housing; tenant-owned hous-
ing; and landlord-owned housing. We developed a model to determine the eﬀect of the rental
externality and tenure security on housing quality. We focused on both maintenance by the
owner, which raises the quality of the accommodation, and utilization by the user, which
reduces its quality. Our main theoretical and empirical results are summarized below.
• When property rights in tenant-owned housing are perfectly protected, a rental con-
tract for land does not create a rental externality problem. Thus, the quality of tenant-
owned housing does not diﬀer from that of owner-owned housing. Tenure security,
however, induces over-utilization, because it only strengthens the tenure rights. This
induces over-maintenance, when the tenant’s utilization and maintenance are comple-
ments. Therefore, the eﬀect of tenure security on the quality of tenant-owned housing
is ambiguous.
• If utilization by the tenant is not veriﬁable, then a rental contract for housing creates
a rental externality problem: the initial tenant over-utilizes the housing. When the
landlord reacts by reducing maintenance in line with the increased utilization rate, the
higher the utilization rate, the lower the landlord’s maintenance. Therefore, in this case,
rental-housing quality is reduced by the rental externality. Because tenure security in
Japan weakens the property rights of landlords and strengthens the tenure rights of
tenants, tenure security further increases tenants’ utilization and decreases landlords’
maintenance when tenants’ utilization and landlords’ maintenance are substitutes. In
this instance, tenure security accelerates the deterioration of rental housing, as does the
rental externality.
• The empirical tests, conducted using data from the 1998 Japanese Housing Demand
Survey, shows that the quality of tenant-owned housing does not diﬀer from owner-
owned housing in the absence of tenure security. It also shows that landlord-owned
housing is less likely to be in a sound condition than owner-owned housing due to the
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rental externality. Furthermore, the empirical results conﬁrm that tenure security has an
ambiguous eﬀect on tenant-owned housing quality and accelerates deterioration in the
quality of landlord-owned housing. Thus, our empirical results conﬁrm the theoretical
predictions.
• These theoretical and empirical results oﬀer a major policy implication: protection of
the property rights of the homeowner enhances the quality of dwellings and achieves
more eﬃcient contracts.
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Table 1
Frequency/Mean/Mode of variables
Variable All observations Owner-owned Tenant-owned Landlord-owned
Building condition (%)
Sound 89.2 90.1 85.4 75.5
Not sound 10.8 9.9 14.4 24.5
Tenure mode (%)
Owner-owned 89.6
Tenant-owned 5.2
Landlord-owned 5.2
Building age (%)
Built pre-1970 26.5 25.7 35.8 35.9
Built 1971–1980 29.2 29.1 24.2 32.3
Built 1981–1990 24.9 25.1 21.1 21.6
Built 1991–1998 19.4 20.2 18.8 10.2
Move-in age (%)
Move-in pre-1970 23.0 23.5 32.2 8.4
Move-in 1971–1980 26.3 27.1 23.7 10.1
Move-in 1981–1990 26.0 26.1 23.1 24.6
Move-in 1991–1998 24.7 23.3 21.1 57.0
Construction material (%)
Wooden 92.2 92.2 91.1 95.1
SRC 5.5 5.6 6.8 3.6
Block 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3
Others 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.0
Geography (%)
Tokyo 2.0 1.7 7.3 1.8
Large city 10.2 10.0 10.7 14.4
Other area 87.8 88.4 82.0 83.8
Room 5.0 6.1 5.6 4.0
Income (million yen) 6–7 6–7 6–7 3–4
Number of observations 43,520 39,013 2,267 2,240
Table 2
Probit coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects (Owner-owned and tenant-owned)
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard error Marginal eﬀect
Intercept 1.668∗∗∗ 0.051
Built pre-1970
Move-in pre-1970 −1.392∗∗∗ 0.042 −0.193∗∗∗
Move-in 1971–1980 −1.335∗∗∗ 0.078 −0.185∗∗∗
Move-in 1981–1990 −1.313∗∗∗ 0.099 −0.182∗∗∗
Move-in 1991–1998 −1.385∗∗∗ 0.114 −0.192∗∗∗
Built 1971–1980
Move-in 1971–1980 −0.913∗∗∗ 0.042 −0.126∗∗∗
Move-in 1981–1990 −0.851∗∗∗ 0.074 −0.118∗∗∗
Move-in 1991–1998 −0.886∗∗∗ 0.089 −0.123∗∗∗
Built 1981–1990
Move-in 1981–1990 −0.466∗∗∗ 0.045 −0.064∗∗∗
Move-in 1991–1998 −0.479∗∗∗ 0.097 −0.066∗∗∗
Built pre-1970×Tenant-owned
Move-in pre-1970 −0 .00004 0.053 −0.00001
Move-in 1971–1980 −0 .042 0.248 −0.006
Move-in 1981–1990 −0 .427 ∗ 0.238 −0.059∗
Move-in 1991–1998 −0.158 0.344 −0.022
Built 1971–1980×Tenant-owned
Move-in 1971–1980 −0 .247 ∗∗∗ 0.069 −0.034∗∗∗
Move-in 1981–1990 −0 .068 0.333 −0.009
Move-in 1991–1998 −0.449 0.341 −0.062
Built 1981–1990×Tenant-owned
Move-in 1981–1990 −0 .102 0.100 −0.014
Move-in 1991–1998 −0.436 0.414 −0.060
Built 1991–1998×Tenant-owned
Move-in 1991–1998 0.029 0.166 0.004
SRC 0.161∗∗∗ 0.048
Block −0.130 0.129
Others 0.086 0.090
Tokyo −0.317∗∗∗ 0.058
Large city 0.042 0.031
Room 0.045∗∗∗ 0.006
Income 0.055∗∗∗ 0.005
Number of observations 41, 280
Pseudo R2 0.122
Log-likelihood −11918.09
Bold ﬁgures capture the eﬀect of the rental externality.
Italic ﬁgures capture the eﬀect of tenure security.
∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 1%; ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 10%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 3. The effect of tenure security on owner-owned housing. 
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Fig. 4. The effect of tenure security on tenant-owned housing 
-6.4 -6.6
-12.3
-19.3 -18.5 -19.2
-16.0
-11.8
-24.1
-30
-20
-10
0
 pre-1970  1971-1980  1981-1990  1991-1998
Built 1981-1990
Builit 1971-1980
Built pre-1970
Move-in age
%
Table 3
Probit coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects (Owner-owned and landlord-owned)
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard error Marginal eﬀect
Intercept 1.656∗∗∗ 0.051
Built pre-1970
Move-in pre-1970 −1.386∗∗∗ 0.042 −0.199∗∗∗
Move-in 1971–1980 −1.332∗∗∗ 0.078 −0.191∗∗∗
Move-in 1981–1990 −1.308∗∗∗ 0.099 −0.187∗∗∗
Move-in 1991–1998 −1.380∗∗∗ 0.114 −0.198∗∗∗
Built 1971–1980
Move-in 1971–1980 −0.911∗∗∗ 0.042 −0.130∗∗∗
Move-in 1981–1990 −0.848∗∗∗ 0.0744 −0.122∗∗∗
Move-in 1991–1998 −0.883∗∗∗ 0.089 −0.127∗∗∗
Built 1981–1990
Move-in 1981–1990 −0.464∗∗∗ 0.045 −0.067∗∗∗
Move-in 1991–1998 −0.479∗∗∗ 0.097 −0.069∗∗∗
Built pre-1970×Landlord-owned
Move-in pre-1970 −0 .474 ∗∗∗ 0.095 −0.068∗∗∗
Move-in 1971–1980 −0 .477 ∗∗∗ 0.134 −0.068∗∗∗
Move-in 1981–1990 −0 .518 ∗∗∗ 0.127 −0.074∗∗∗
Move-in 1991–1998 −0.125 0.132 −0.018
Built 1971–1980×Landlord-owned
Move-in 1971–1980 −0 .718 ∗∗∗ 0.129 −0.103∗∗∗
Move-in 1981–1990 −0 .395 ∗∗∗ 0.118 −0.057∗∗∗
Move-in 1991–1998 −0.343∗∗∗ 0.107 −0.049∗∗∗
Built 1981–1990×Landlord-owned
Move-in 1981–1990 −0 .641 ∗∗∗ 0.129 −0.092∗∗∗
Move-in 1991–1998 −0.295∗∗ 0.129 −0.042∗∗∗
Built 1991–1998×Landlord-owned
Move-in 1991–1998 −0.407∗∗∗ 0.149 −0.058∗∗∗
SRC 0.190∗∗∗ 0.049
Block −0.255∗∗ 0.127
Others 0.111 0.092
Tokyo −0.335∗∗∗ 0.063
Large city 0.046 0.030
Room 0.044∗∗∗ 0.006
Income 0.057∗∗∗ 0.005
Number of observations 41, 253
Pseudo R2 0.130
Log-likelihood −12204.04
Bold ﬁgures capture the eﬀect of the rental externality.
Italic ﬁgures capture the eﬀect of tenure security.
∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 1%; ∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 5%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. The effect of tenure security on landlord-owned housing 
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